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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal is from a decision in an adversary proceeding 
brought by plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee Committee of 
Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims (the "Committee") 
against defendant-appellee/cross-appellant Citicorp 
Venture Capital, Ltd. ("CVC"). The action arises out of the 
chapter 11 reorganization of Papercraft Corporationfiled in 
the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Committee claims 
that CVC, while a fiduciary of Papercraft, secretly 
purchased millions of dollars of claims against Papercraft at 
a discount, seeking to control Papercraft's assets and make 
a profit at the expense of Papercraft's other creditors. CVC 
contends that the claims were properly purchased and that 
it acted in the best interests of both the company and its 
creditors. After a trial, the bankruptcy court entered a 
judgment against CVC, allowing CVC's purchased claims 
only to the extent of the discounted amount CVC paid for 
them and limiting its recovery to the percentage 
distribution provided in the plan multiplied by that 
discounted amount. On appeal, the district court agreed 
with the bankruptcy court's finding that CVC had breached 
its fiduciary duties, acted inequitably, and caused injury to 
Papercraft and its creditors. It disagreed, however, with the 
bankruptcy court's chosen remedy and remanded for a 
redetermination regarding the appropriate remedial action. 
This appeal followed. 
 
I. THE FACTS FOUND BY THE BANKRUPTCY COURT* 
 
In 1985, Papercraft completed a leveraged buyout in 
which CVC invested $5.8 million. As a result of this 
transaction, CVC was given a 28% equity interest in 
Papercraft's direct parent, Amalgamated Investment Corp., 
and the right to seat one representative on the boards of 
directors of Amalgamated, Papercraft, and Papercraft's 
wholly-owned operating subsidiaries, Barth & Dreyfuss of 
California and Knomark, Inc. CVC's vice president, M. 
Saleem Muqaddam, became CVC's representative on these 
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boards of directors, and he remained such during the time 
period relevant to this appeal. 
 
Papercraft ran into financial difficulties a few years after 
the transaction, which forced a restructuring of the 
leveraged buyout ("LBO") debt. As part of the restructuring, 
Papercraft exchanged about 98% of its indebtedness for 
new First Priority Notes and Second Priority Notes. 
However, beginning in 1990, Papercraft was unable to meet 
the terms of the notes and sought to negotiate a second 
restructuring of its unsecured debt. An informal committee 
of major Papercraft creditors was formed and, after several 
months of negotiations, an agreement was reached on a 
restructuring plan. The plan, known as the "BDK plan," 
called for a merger of Papercraft's operating subsidiaries 
(Barth & Dreyfuss and Knomark) into a single entity, BDK 
Holdings, Inc., as part of a voluntary chapter 11 petition to 
be filed by Papercraft. The creditors' claims against 
Papercraft would then be converted into "BDK Units" 
consisting of stock and bonds issued by the new venture. 
The BDK plan was approved unanimously by Papercraft's 
directors, including CVC's Muqaddam, in March 1991. 
 
Papercraft filed its voluntary petition under chapter 11 on 
March 22, 1991. As of the filing date, Papercraft had 
outstanding $90.7 million in First Priority Notes and $56.3 
million in Second Priority Notes, none of which were held 
by CVC. Pursuant to the agreement among the creditors, 
Papercraft filed the BDK plan with the chapter 11 petition 
and an official Committee was formed to represent the 
interests of unsecured creditors. 
 
Though the chapter 11 petition and BDK plan werefiled 
in March 1991, the required Papercraft disclosure 
statement, a prerequisite to confirmation of the plan, was 
not filed until October 1991. During this delay, CVC 
managed to purchase over 40% of the outstanding notes, at 
a significant discount. CVC, despite its earlier support of 
the BDK plan, then objected to the confirmation of that 
plan and offered its own competing plan, which called for a 
CVC purchase of Papercraft's assets. An account of the 
specific circumstances under which CVC took these actions 
follows. 
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In March 1991, Muqaddam, in a memorandum to CVC's 
Investment Committee, sought authorization to spend up to 
$10 million purchasing Papercraft notes. CVC officials 
granted the request in April 1991. Muqaddam, acting for 
CVC, then began making anonymous purchases of notes 
through various brokers. Between April and August 1991, 
CVC purchased $60,849,575.72 face value of the Papercraft 
notes for $10,553,541.88. These purchases represented a 
significant proportion of the outstanding Papercraft debt: 
CVC managed to acquire 38.3% of Papercraft's outstanding 
First Priority Notes and 46.4% of outstanding Second 
Priority Notes. In all, CVC's purchases amounted to 40.8% 
of Papercraft's total unsecured claims. It thus achieved a 
"blocking" position in the proposed reorganization. 
Although Muqaddam was a member of Papercraft's board, 
and therefore a fiduciary to the company and its creditors, 
neither he nor anyone else from CVC requested or obtained 
the approval of the board, the Committee, or the court 
before purchasing the notes. Nor did CVC disclose to any of 
the selling creditors its identity as buyer or itsfiduciary 
status. 
 
At the same time CVC was surreptitiously purchasing 
claims, it also requested or otherwise obtained confidential 
information about Papercraft's financial stability and 
assets, including information that was not shared with 
Papercraft's other creditors. In early 1991, at Muqaddam's 
direction, two CVC employees visited the headquarters of 
Papercraft's Barth & Dreyfuss subsidiary to obtain 
information. During that visit, CVC copied financial 
statements, looked at the company's product lines, held 
meetings with management, and toured the facilities. A 
written report was subsequently completed by CVC, drafts 
of which were shared with Papercraft personnel. Indeed, 
Frank Kane, Papercraft's Chief Financial Officer, reviewed 
the report and gave comments directly to Muqaddam. None 
of this information was shared with the Committee. 
Papercraft personnel also forwarded a number offinancial 
analyses and other documents directly to CVC, including a 
tax analysis that had been completed by a consultingfirm 
at Muqaddam's request. In addition, a valuation of 
Papercraft assets and a distressed sale analysis completed 
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by Chanin and Company, the Committee's own financial 
advisor, was given to CVC by Papercraft personnel. 
 
As CVC accumulated Papercraft debt and information 
between April and August 1991, it also formulated a 
reorganization plan designed to compete with the previously 
filed BDK plan. Muqaddam and his staff prepared a series 
of reports evaluating the possibility of a CVC asset 
purchase offer. These reports were based, in large part, on 
the information about Papercraft that had been forwarded 
to CVC by Kane. In the course of preparing an asset 
purchase offer, Muqaddam held a meeting with Kane and 
the Bank of New York Credit Corporation ("BNYCC") to 
discuss financing for a CVC asset purchase offer. 
Muqaddam then prepared a memorandum to CVC's 
Investment Committee requesting authorization to purchase 
Papercraft's assets. This authority was granted to 
Muqaddam in August 1991. 
 
In early September 1991, CVC formalized an asset 
purchase offer by sending a letter to Papercraft detailing 
the plan and announcing a financing arrangement with 
BNYCC. Shortly before this announcement, Muqaddam 
informed the Committee, for the first time, that CVC had 
been purchasing claims. Soon after the asset purchase offer 
was announced, it was filed as a plan of reorganization by 
Papercraft. Papercraft also filed disclosure statements for 
both the BDK plan and the CVC plan in October 1991. 
 
The BDK plan disclosure statement was approved by the 
bankruptcy court at a hearing in December 1991. Shortly 
thereafter, CVC withdrew its plan of reorganization, but 
then filed objections to confirmation of the BDK plan. The 
bankruptcy court overruled those objections and confirmed 
the BDK plan in January 1992. 
 
II. THE PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
 
In October 1991, the Committee initiated this adversary 
proceeding against CVC, objecting to the allowance of the 
claims CVC had purchased and seeking equitable 
subordination of those claims. After extensive discovery, a 
trial was held over two days in November 1994. After 
reviewing the testimony and evidence, the bankruptcy court 
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ruled in favor of the Committee. The court held that CVC 
had failed to meet its fiduciary obligation to act in the best 
interest of Papercraft and its creditors. See In re Papercraft 
Corp., 187 B.R. 486, 497 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995). It 
identified three adverse effects from CVC's breaches of its 
fiduciary duty. First, the bankruptcy court noted that the 
note holders who sold their claims to CVC "were deprived of 
the ability to make a fully informed decision concerning the 
sale of their claims." Id. Although they might have still 
decided to sell after full disclosure, "[t]he harm lies in the 
fact that the selling noteholders had no opportunity to 
consider pertinent information." Id. 
 
Second, the court concluded that "CVC's actions diluted 
the voting rights of prepetition creditors and resulted in 
CVC's attempt to wrest from the prepetition creditors the 
valuable assets of [Papercraft]." Id. Though CVC did not 
ultimately vote its claims, the court concluded that 
"[n]onetheless, its acquisition of claims placed it in the 
controlling seat in its class," id. at 499 n. 10, and that CVC 
was able to influence the negotiations surrounding the 
terms of the plan despite its ultimate election not to vote. 
 
Finally, the bankruptcy court decided that CVC's actions 
created a conflict of interest which jeopardized its ability "to 
make future decisions on claims as a director free of [its] 
own personal interests as [an] owner of claims. Adding to 
the conflict is the fact that these purchases were made at 
a discount from present value. This brings into play a profit 
motive, accentuating [its] personal interests." Id. at 500 
(quoting In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 181 B.R. 678, 680 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1995)). 
 
To remedy the adverse consequences of CVC's behavior, 
the bankruptcy court applied a "per se rule" that when a 
claim is purchased by an insider at a discount without 
adequate disclosure to the debtor and creditors, "the 
insider's newly acquired claim will be limited to the amount 
paid by the acquiring insider and recovery on the claim will 
be limited to the percentage distribution provided in the 
plan, as applied to the allowed claim." Id. at 491. However, 
the bankruptcy court declined to equitably subordinate 
CVC's claims. 
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On appeal, the district court first reviewed the findings of 
fact made by the bankruptcy court and found none of them 
clearly erroneous. Applying the facts to the test for 
equitable subordination, the district court agreed that CVC 
had acted inequitably and that this behavior had injured 
creditors. As for a remedy, the district court held that 
CVC's recovery should, at a minimum, be limited to the 
amount paid for its claims so as to eliminate any potential 
profits from the purchase of the notes. It disapproved of the 
bankruptcy court's per se rule, however, and remanded to 
the bankruptcy court for a determination of "the amount 
CVC's claims should be subordinated." Id.1 
 
III. THE RIGHT TO RELIEF 
 
Before ordering equitable subordination, most courts 
have required a showing involving three elements: (1) the 
claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable 
conduct, (2) the misconduct must have resulted in injury to 
the creditors or conferred an unfair advantage on the 
claimant, and (3) equitable subordination of the claim must 
not be inconsistent with the provisions of the bankruptcy 
code. U.S. v. Noland, 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996) (describing 
existing case law as consistent with the three part test 
identified in In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th 
Cir. 1977)).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 157(b) & 1334(b). The district court had 
appellate jurisdiction over the bankruptcy court'sfinal judgment 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1). We have jurisdiction over the final 
decision of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 158(d). See In re 
Indian Palms Associates, Ltd., 61 F.3d 197, 199 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
2. This court, in In re Burden, 917 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1990), 
concluded that "creditor misconduct is not [always] a prerequisite for 
equitable subordination." Burden involved subordination of a tax penalty 
in the absence of government misconduct. The Supreme Court, in two 
recent cases regarding the standards for tax penalty subordination, has 
refused to decide whether misconduct is required under S 510(c), 
resolving each case on the principle that "categorical" subordination is 
not permissible. See United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of 
Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 229 (1996); Noland, 517 U.S. at 543. We need 
not here resolve the issue of whether misconduct is always a prerequisite 
to equitable subordination because the bankruptcy court properly found 
misconduct. 
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A. Inequitable Conduct 
 
1. The Legal Sufficiency of the Findings of the 
       Bankruptcy Court 
 
CVC acknowledges that it and its representative, 
Muqaddam, owed a fiduciary duty to Papercraft and its 
creditors at all times relevant here. It asserts, however, that 
neither breached a fiduciary duty. It insists that it is not 
improper per se for a fiduciary to purchase claims against 
the debtor in a bankruptcy at a discount and it stresses 
that the bankruptcy court made no finding that the prices 
paid for the Papercraft notes were unfair or inequitable at 
the time of the purchases. 
 
We accept, arguendo, that the purchase of notes at a 
discount by a fiduciary of a debtor in bankruptcy is not 
improper under all circumstances,3 and we acknowledge 
the absence of a finding on the fairness of the purchase 
price. The bankruptcy court found, however, that the 
Papercraft notes (1) were purchased for the dual purpose of 
making a profit for CVC on the notes and of being able to 
influence the reorganization in its own self-interest, (2) were 
purchased with the benefit of non-public information 
acquired as a fiduciary, and (3) were acquired without 
disclosure of its purchasing plans to the bankruptcy court, 
the Papercraft board, the Committee, or the selling note 
holders. The bankruptcy court further pointed out that 
under Brown v. Presbyterian Ministers, 484 F.2d 998, 1005 
(3d Cir. 1973), the opportunity to purchase the notes was 
a corporate opportunity of which CVC could not avail itself, 
consistent with its fiduciary duty, without giving the 
corporation and its creditors notice and an opportunity to 
participate. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. There is authority arguably to the contrary, but, in light of the 
findings of the bankruptcy court, we need not, and do not, resolve the 
issue here. In Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304, 313-14 
(1949) the court observed, ". . . [I]f it is clear [as it is] that a 
fiduciary 
may ordinarily purchase debt claims in fair transactions during the 
solvency of the corporation, the lower federal courts seem agreed that he 
cannot purchase after judicial proceedings for the relief of a debtor are 
expected or have begun." (citing cases). 
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CVC primarily protests that the bankruptcy court's 
findings of fact concerning inequitable conduct on its part 
are clearly erroneous. We will address that contention in 
the following section. We hold here, however, that the above 
noted findings reflect ample inequitable conduct to support 
a subordination remedy. Indeed, those findings make this a 
paradigm case of inequitable conduct by a fiduciary as that 
concept has been developed in the case law, and we believe 
further elaboration is not required. Before turning to an 
analysis of the record support for these findings, we will 
only comment briefly on two of CVC's justifications for its 
conduct. 
 
CVC insists that the opportunity to purchase the notes 
was not a corporate opportunity, and that notice to 
Papercraft's Board and the Committee was not required 
because Papercraft could not have purchased the notes at 
discount and the members of the Committee had no 
interest in doing so. We agree with the Committee, however, 
that CVC's argument is fundamentally at odds with our 
decision in Brown. 
 
In Brown, we held that the availability of claims for 
purchase at a discount constitutes a corporate opportunity. 
After noting that a director of a solvent corporation may 
take advantage of a corporate opportunity only if he 
discloses the opportunity to the corporation, we further 
held that a director of a corporation in bankruptcy owes a 
fiduciary duty to creditors and cannot seize a corporate 
opportunity without disclosure to the creditors or their 
representative. Even though the director in Brown had 
purchased a note at discount with the consent of the 
corporation and its stockholders, we concluded that a 
breach of fiduciary duty had occurred: "The opportunity 
should have been disclosed to the receiver as representative 
of the creditors." Id. at 1005. 
 
CVC contends that Brown is distinguishable because 
Papercraft was not in a financial or legal position to 
purchase the notes and because the members of the 
Committee must have been well aware that a market 
existed in Papercraft debt. It necessarily follows, according 
to CVC, that neither could have been injured by its 
purchases. We believe this argument more relevant to the 
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remedy issue than to whether a breach of fiduciary duty 
occurred. That duty required that it share everything that 
it knew with Papercraft's board and the Committee before 
commencing its purchases. Its failure to do so would alone 
support a subordination depriving it of its profit from the 
note transactions. The absence of a disclosure in 
circumstances of this kind makes it extremely difficult to 
say with confidence what would have happened had no 
breach of duty occurred4 and that, in itself, is a compelling 
reason for insisting on disclosure. 
 
CVC also argues that its failure to disclose its identity to 
note sellers was not inequitable because its identity was not 
material to the purchases. It stresses that no note sellers 
have thus far complained. We agree with the bankruptcy 
court, however, that CVC's identity and purchasing plans 
were clearly material to the purchase transaction. The fact 
that CVC, a party with access to inside information, was 
seeking to purchase over $10 million in Papercraft debt and 
to steer the reorganization towards a sale to it of 
Papercraft's assets would certainly have been of interest to 
a creditor considering a CVC offer to purchase in the 
summer of 1991. 
 
In short, we agree with the bankruptcy court, the district 
court, and the Committee that CVC violated its fiduciary 
duty in a number of significant respects. 
 
2. Record Support for the Bankruptcy Court's Findings 
 
CVC's most fundamental challenge to the factual findings 
of the bankruptcy court relates to the disclosure issue. It 
asserts that the court clearly erred in concluding that CVC 
anonymously purchased the Papercraft notes. While CVC 
makes no claim that it acted affirmatively to notify anyone 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. If the attention of the Papercraft board and the Committee had been 
focused on the potential CVC perceived in its note purchases, it is not 
at all clear that Papercraft or its creditors would have been unable to 
tap 
additional resources, just as CVC did. Either or both might have been 
able to seize or participate in the opportunity through borrowing, court 
approved purchases or amendment to the plan of reorganization to 
include a cash-out option. See, e.g., In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 181 
B.R. 678 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). 
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of its purchases prior to the consummation of its 
purchasing plan, it maintains that the sophisticated 
investors on the Committee knew that CVC was buying 
claims and chose to keep quiet about it in order to gain a 
"litigation windfall" by filing suit once CVC announced its 
position. Specifically, CVC claims that the courts below 
clearly erred in finding that the Committee had no 
knowledge of CVC's claims purchases until after CVC 
announced its competing reorganization plan. 
 
To support its argument, CVC relies upon minutes of a 
conference call held by the Committee on April 15, 1991. 
Those minutes reflect that "there was mention of the fact 
that American Money [a creditor of Papercraft] had sold its 
notes to Citicorp." App. at 1558. In addition, CVC points to 
testimony of the Committee's chair, Pamela Cascioli, that 
she had been made aware of rumors that CVC had 
purchased American Money's claims. However, the minutes 
of the conference call and the testimony of Cascioli were 
illuminated by witnesses at trial, who testified that the 
discussion during the conference call lasted thirty seconds 
and that such rumors are commonplace, generally 
unfounded, and would not normally warrant additional 
inquiry. The bankruptcy court credited this testimony and 
specifically found that, other than the rumor, the 
"committee heard no more about [claims purchasing 
activity] until CVC made its asset purchase offer in 
September of 1991." 187 B.R. at 492. It appears that the 
bankruptcy court weighed the effect of the rumor in light of 
the explanatory testimony and credited the Committee's 
explanation. CVC provides no convincing reason to 
conclude that this determination was clearly erroneous.5 
 
CVC next challenges the court's finding as to its motive 
in purchasing the notes. It suggests that it was acting in 
the best interest of the company by offering a cash-out 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. CVC strenuously argues that the bankruptcy court should not be 
allowed to simply rest on a credibility determination when documentary 
evidence supports a different conclusion. However, in this case the 
documentary evidence was explained by the testimony at trial, which the 
court found credible. There is nothing unusual about a court finding 
credible one plausible explanation of the significance of documentary 
evidence. 
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option to creditors that was not available under the BDK 
plan. As we have noted, however, the court found that CVC 
intended to profit not only from the purchase of the notes 
at discount but also from gaining control of the 
reorganization. These findings were supported, inter alia, by 
the testimony of CVC's own people. Muqaddam admitted 
that he expected to make a profit from the note purchases, 
and the chairman of CVC stated that those purchases 
would help CVC "influence something." Id. at 495-96, 500. 
The evidence clearly permits an inference that CVC was 
primarily motivated by its own self-interest in purchasing 
claims. Accordingly, the court did not clearly err in drawing 
that inference. 
 
CVC also contests the court's determination that its 
access to material, non-public information as an insider 
influenced its purchases of Papercraft notes. The court 
relied upon evidence establishing that Papercraft's then- 
Chief Financial Officer, Frank Kane, conducted valuations 
of the company based on CVC's proposed asset purchase -- 
analyses that were not provided to the Committee. In 
addition, the court found that some of CVC's information 
was not public when received, and that CVC was given 
priority treatment by Papercraft in responding to requests 
for information. As the court accurately put it,"CVC had 
virtually unrestricted access to inside information and 
significant assistance from [Papercraft] through its 
employees and staff and its control over employees." Id. at 
496. 
 
CVC argues that though it was an insider, the 
information it received did not differ materially from that 
available to the other creditors, who were all sophisticated 
institutional investors. The bankruptcy court's conclusion 
to the contrary is supported, however, by evidence that 
CVC obtained special financial information andfinancial 
and tax valuations in order to evaluate its own asset 
purchase proposal, which was itself directly supported by 
the note purchases. CVC's argument that the special 
analyses it received were immaterial rings hollow in light of 
its use of that information in purchasing claims and 
preparing its asset purchase offer. 
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In short, our review of the record convinces us that the 
crucial findings we have referenced as demonstrating 
inequitable conduct are not clearly erroneous. 
 
B. Injury or Unfair Advantage 
 
As we have noted, the bankruptcy court identified three 
areas of injury or unfair advantage suffered by the 
Committee and Papercraft as a result of CVC's secret 
purchase of claims at a discount. First, the court found 
that selling note holders were deprived of the ability to 
make a fully informed decision to sell their claims. Second, 
the court concluded that CVC diluted the voting rights of 
members of the Committee. Though CVC ultimately did not 
vote its claims, the court indicated that its purchased 
claims secured a position of influence over the 
reorganization negotiations. Finally, the court held that 
CVC's actions created a conflict of interest which 
jeopardized its ability to make decisions in the best interest 
of the company, free from its competing profit motive. 
 
The district court also found these "injuries and unfair 
advantages" to be sufficient to warrant an equitable 
subordination remedy. It emphasized that CVC had 
"engaged in a comprehensive information collection effort 
made possible by its position on Papercraft's Board . . . and 
then used this information to prepare its own asset 
purchase offer which directly competed with the BDK plan." 
Op. at 21. While the district court makes no express 
reference to it, the Committee points us to trial testimony 
from its financial advisor indicating that this competing 
reorganization plan and CVC's associated objections to the 
BDK plan resulted in confirmation delay that inflicted 
substantial injury on Papercraft's non-selling creditors. 
 
The bankruptcy court did not attempt to quantify the 
harms caused in economic terms, and CVC characterizes 
them as "noneconomic" harms. We do not agree with this 
characterization, however, and, like the bankruptcy and 
district courts, we conclude that they are sufficient to 
justify subordination. 
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C. Consistency with the Code 
 
Finally, a remedy of equitable subordination under 
S 510(c) must not be inconsistent with other provisions of 
the bankruptcy code. This requirement "has been read as a 
`reminder to the bankruptcy court that although it is a 
court of equity, it is not free to adjust the legally valid claim 
of an innocent party who asserts the claim in good faith 
merely because the court perceives the result is 
inequitable.' " Noland, 517 U.S. at 539 (quoting DeNatale & 
Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied 
to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. Law 417, 428 (1985). 
 
CVC makes the argument that other provisions of the 
bankruptcy code, including those related to voting of claims 
and transfer of claims, provide all the remedy necessary for 
inappropriate insider activity. While these provisions may 
also be applicable, we perceive no reason why the 
availability of alternative remedies makes equitable 
subordination under S 510(c) incompatible with the Code 
under the circumstances of this case. 
 
IV. THE REMEDY 
 
The bankruptcy court and the district court agreed that 
CVC's inequitable conduct warranted a remedy and that, at 
a minimum, it should not be permitted to profit by its 
purchase of Papercraft notes. Their agreement ended there, 
however. The bankruptcy court applied a per se rule that 
whenever an insider purchases a claim of a debtor without 
disclosure to the debtor and its creditors, that claim will be 
"allowed" under S 201 only to the extent of the amount paid 
and "recovery on the claim will be limited to the percentage 
distribution provided in the plan, as applied to the allowed 
claim." 187 B.R. at 491. Having imposed that remedy, the 
bankruptcy court concluded that equitable subordination of 
CVC's entire claim would "not [be] consistent with the 
Code." Id. at 502. As it explained: 
 
       In the instant case we find that the first two[elements 
       of equitable subordination] have been met but, because 
       of our limitation on the allowance of CVC's claims, 
       equitable subordination is not consistent with the 
       Code. We have previously held that "principles of 
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       fairness would be violated if insiders who create an 
       unfair advantage for themselves were permitted to 
       share equally with other creditors." In re I.D. Craig 
       Service Corp., 1991 WL 155750 at *7 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
       August 8, 1991). Because we are limiting the allowed 
       amount of CVC's claim to the amount it paid for the 
       claims, with recovery under the plan gauged to that 
       amount, we have adhered to principles of fairness 
       without the necessity of subordinating CVC's claim. 
 
Id. at 502. 
 
The district court held that the bankruptcy court's per se 
remedy did more than deprive CVC of its profit on its 
investment in Papercraft notes, an objective that could be 
accomplished by subjecting CVC claims to subordination to 
the extent necessary to limit its recovery to the amount 
paid. The district court estimated that the remedy imposed 
by the bankruptcy court would reduce CVC's recovery 
approximately $7.5 million below the amount necessary to 
deprive it of profit. While it acknowledged that 
subordination beyond that necessary to deprive CVC of 
profit might be warranted here, it declined to approve 
further subordination in the absence of appropriate 
findings. The court thus held: 
 
       [B]ecause it adopted a per se rule, the Bankruptcy 
       Court did not have the opportunity to make factual 
       findings as to how an additional $7,489,941.88 
       reduction in CVC's recovery comports with the 
       principles of equitable subordination. We do not 
       conclude today, however, that CVC's claims may not be 
       subordinated by such an amount but only that any 
       amount of subordination beyond the limitation of 
       CVC's recovery to the amount paid for such claims 
       should be supported by factual findings and reconciled 
       with the principles of equity. We believe this to be a 
       finding of fact best left to the Bankruptcy Court, not 
       this Court sitting as a court of appeal. Accordingly, we 
       will remand the case to the Bankruptcy Court for a 
       finding on the amount CVC's claims should be 
       subordinated pursuant to the principles of equitable 
       subordination. 
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Op. at 26-27. 
 
We agree with the district court. At a minimum, the 
remedy here should deprive CVC of its profit on the 
purchase of the notes. That can be accomplished by 
subordinating CVC's claim under S 510(c) to the extent 
necessary in order to limit its recovery to the purchase 
price of the notes.6 Further subordination may be 
appropriate, but only if supported by findings that justify 
the remedy chosen by reference to equitable principles.7 In 
the absence of such findings, neither the district court nor 
we are in a position to fulfill our assigned responsibility of 
review. 
 
By so concluding, we do not suggest that a bankruptcy 
court can never impose a subordination remedy beyond 
disgorgement of profit without putting a specific price tag 
on the loss suffered by those who will benefit from the 
subordination. Such quantification may not always be 
feasible and, where that is the case, it should not redound 
to the benefit of the wrongdoer. A bankruptcy court should, 
however, attempt to identify the nature and extent of the 
harm it intends to compensate in a manner that will permit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We do not read the case law cited by the Committee and the 
bankruptcy court to suggest the contrary. 
 
7. In the course of reaching its holding, the district court concluded 
that 
S 510(c) is the exclusive remedy available to a bankruptcy court in 
circumstances like these and that the bankruptcy court was accordingly 
without authority to fashion a "disallowance" remedy. We do not endorse 
that conclusion. In Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), the Supreme 
Court held that the bankruptcy court exercised its statutory 
responsibilities as a court of equity and indicated that a purchase of 
claims against a debtor in bankruptcy by a fiduciary, when consistent 
with principles of equity, may properly lead either to the "disallowance" 
of the fiduciary's claim or to the subordination thereof. The rationale of 
Pepper would suggest that under pre-Code law a bankruptcy court was 
authorized to disallow a portion of the fiduciary's claim when that would 
produce an equitable result. We find it unnecessary here to resolve the 
issue as to whether equitable "disallowance" remains an available 
remedy. The Committee sought subordination under S 510(c), the district 
court has appropriately remanded this matter to the bankruptcy court 
for application of S 510(c), and neither side maintains that the authority 
granted by that section cannot be utilized to fashion a just remedy. 
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a judgment to be made regarding the proportionality of the 
remedy to the injury that has been suffered by those who 
will benefit from the subordination. If that is not possible, 
the court should specifically so find. 
 
Inherent in what we have just said is the equitable 
principle that any subordination should not result in a 
windfall to those benefitted by it based on injury to others 
outside the benefitted class. Stoumbos v. Kilimnik, 988 F.2d 
949, 960 (9th Cir. 1993) ("A claim will be subordinated only 
to the claims of other creditors whom the inequitable 
conduct has disadvantaged."); Matter of Herby's Foods, Inc., 
2 F.3d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1993) (subordination proper only 
to the extent necessary to offset the harm the creditors 
suffered as a result of the inequitable conduct). This 
principle is applicable here because the Papercraft creditors 
who sold their claims to CVC will not benefit from any 
subordination. Accordingly, any injury to them must play 
no role in determining the extent of any subordination here 
of CVC's claims. If they consider themselves aggrieved, they 
must be left to the other remedies afforded them by law. 
 
While we agree with CVC's criticism of the bankruptcy 
court's remedy, we decline to accept its argument that the 
record is devoid of any evidence that would support a 
remedy going beyond disgorgement of profit. Without 
limiting the inquiry of the bankruptcy court in any way, we 
note that there is evidence which would support afinding 
that the non-selling Papercraft creditors suffered injury 
from CVC's attempt to control the reorganization. While the 
bankruptcy court held, with record support, that the delay 
between the filing of the petition and the filing of the 
disclosure statement was not attributable to CVC's 
machinations, it made no similar finding with respect to the 
period of delay between the filing of the disclosure 
statement and confirmation of the BDK plan. Moreover, 
while the bankruptcy court found "no evidence that CVC 
engaged in conduct designed to delay the plan process," if 
CVC's pursuit of its own interest in fact resulted in delay of 
the confirmation, we do not read that finding as 
inconsistent with subordination based on injury resulting 
from that delay. On remand, the bankruptcy court should 
consider whether the record supports the proposition that 
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the non-selling creditors suffered loss as a result of a delay 
in confirmation caused by CVC advocacy of its competing 
plan and objections to the BDK plan. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. In 
accordance with that judgment, this case will be remanded 
to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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